

6.3. Self-Support	104
6.4. Strategic Equilibrium	108
6.5. Realization of an Equilibrium	111
6.6. Appendix: Realization of a Nash Equilibrium	115
7. Coordination	120
7.1. Strategy and Learning	120
7.2. Changing the Rules	122
7.3. An Efficient Equilibrium	127
7.4. Preparation	131
7.5. Intentions	135
8. Cooperative Games	139
8.1. Joint Action	139
8.2. Opportunities for Joint Action	145
8.3. Coalitional Games	153
8.4. The Core	156
8.5. An Empty Core	159
9. Strategy for Coalitions	163
9.1. A Coalition's Incentives	163
9.2. Paths of Incentives	169
9.3. Strategic Equilibria in Coalitional Games	175
10. Illustrations and Comparisons	183
10.1. The Majority-Rule Game	183
10.2. Comparisons	185
10.3. Conflict	190
10.4. Collective Standards	195
11. Compositionality	201
11.1. Underlying Games	201
11.2. Confirmation	204
11.3. Agreement Games	206
11.4. The Core and Utility Maximization	210
11.5. Strategic Equilibrium and Self-Support	212

12. Implications	216
12.1. Social Institutions	216
12.2. Strategic Equilibrium and Institutions	221
12.3. Theoretical Unity	223
12.4. Future Research	225
<i>Notes</i>	229
<i>Bibliography</i>	249
<i>Index</i>	263