## Contents

List of Figures Introduction		xi xiii
2.	Against Presentism	II
	1. Two issues in the philosophy of time: ontology and tense	II
	2. Cross-time spatial relations	25
	3. The truth-maker objection	35
	4. Presentism and special relativity	42
3.	Three- and Four-Dimensionalism Stated	53
	I. Why fuss over formulation?	53
	2. Four-dimensionalism stated	55
	3. What is three-dimensionalism?	63
	4. Perdurance, endurance, presentism, and eternalism	68
4.	In Favor of Four-Dimensionalism, Part 1	74
	1. Russell's argument from parsimony	75
	2. The argument from logic	76
	3. The A-theory of time is incoherent	78
	4. Four-dimensionalism and special relativity	79
	5. Space and time are analogous	87
	6. The problem of temporary intrinsics	92
	7. Arguments from exotica	98
	8. The argument from spacetime	110
	9. The argument from vagueness	120
5.	In Favor of Four-Dimensionalism, Part 2: The Best Unified	
	Theory of the Paradoxes of Coincidence	140
	1. The threat of coincidence	141
	2. The worm theory and coincidence	152

ç.

3. Coinciding three-dimensional objects	154
4. Burke's dominance account	161
5. Temporary identity	165
6. Eliminativism	176
7. Mereological essentialism	180
8. The stage view	188
6. Arguments against Four-Dimensionalism	209
1. Linguistic and epistemic objections	209
2. The no-change objection	212
3. A crazy metaphysic	216
4. The modal argument	218
5. Motion in homogeneous substances	224
	•
References	237
Indax	2.57