
Contents

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction xiii

Part I 1

1 The Ten Problems 3

- 1.1 Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced 3
- 1.2 The Problem of Ownership 10
- 1.3 The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity 12
- 1.4 The Problem of Mechanism 15
- 1.5 The Problem of Phenomenal Causation 18
- 1.6 The Problem of Super Blindsight 19
- 1.7 The Problem of Duplicates 21
- 1.8 The Problem of the Inverted Spectrum 26
- 1.9 The Problem of Transparency 30
- 1.10 The Problem of Felt Location and Phenomenal Vocabulary 31
- 1.11 The Problem of the Alien Limb 33

2 Why the Problems Run So Deep 37

- 2.1 Must the Physical Be Objective? 38
- 2.2 Perspectival Subjectivity and the Explanatory Gap 43
- 2.3 Physicalism and Phenomenal Causation 50
- 2.4 On the Denial of Perspectival Subjectivity 53
- 2.5 The Paradox of Phenomenal Consciousness 56
- 2.6 The Available Strategies 62
- 2.7 The Way Ahead 66

Part II 69

- 3 Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains? 71**
- 3.1 The Repudiation of Phenomenal Objects 72
 - 3.2 Publicizing the Phenomenal: Split Brains 78
 - 3.3 Phenomenal Objects as Events 84
 - 3.4 A Closer Look at Events 87
- 4 The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences 93**
- 4.1 Intentional States and Intentional Content 94
 - 4.2 How Perceptual Sensations Represent 100
 - 4.3 Afterimages 105
 - 4.4 The Problem of Ownership Revisited 109
 - 4.5 Pains 111
 - 4.6 Other Bodily Sensations 116
 - 4.7 The Format of Sensory Representations 120
 - 4.8 Background Feelings 123
 - 4.9 Emotions 125
 - 4.10 Moods 128
- 5 What What It's Like Is Really Like 133**
- 5.1 Why Be an Intentionalist? 134
 - 5.2 Phenomenal Content: The PANIC Theory 137
 - 5.3 Colors and Other "Secondary Qualities" 144
 - 5.4 Can Duplicate Brains Differ Phenomenally? 150
 - 5.5 Some Putative Counterexamples 155
- 6 The Tale of Mary and Mechanism: A Theory of Perspectival Subjectivity 161**
- 6.1 The Real Nature of the Phenomenal 162
 - 6.2 Perspectival Subjectivity and the Paradox 165
 - 6.3 Mary's Room 171
 - 6.4 Some of Mary's Philosophical Relatives 174
 - 6.5 The Explanatory Gap 178
- 7 Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can? 183**
- 7.1 The Status of the PANIC Theory 184
 - 7.2 Imaginability and Perception: A Parallel 185
 - 7.3 Troublesome Possibilities? 188

7.4	Zombie Replicas and Other Duplicates	194
7.5	Inverted Experiences	201
7.6	Inverted Earth	206
Appendix: Blindsight		209
A.1	Three Sorts of Visual Agnosia	209
A.2	An Empirical Proposal	215
Notes		219
References		231
Name Index		241
Subject Index		245