

Contents

Introduction	I
1. Regimentation	14
1.1. Regimentation as Linguistic Policy	14
1.2. Ambiguity	17
1.3. Is Regimentation Possible?	20
1.4. Vagueness	22
1.5. Quantifier Domains, Tense, and Time	25
1.6. Descriptions and Proper Names	27
1.7. Pronouns and Demonstratives	30
1.8. Why Ordinary Language is Indispensable	32
1.9. Limitations of First-Order Logic	33
2. The Tarski–Quine Thesis	40
2.1. The Indispensability Argument	40
2.2. Why Generalize on Valid Sentences?	48
2.3. Three Attempts to Generalize on Sentences without Using a Truth Predicate	52
2.4. Horwich’s Minimal Theory	58
2.5. A Naive Theory of Why it is Epistemically Reasonable for us to Accept T-Sentences	63
2.6. Surrogate T-Sentences and Explication	65
2.7. Tarski’s Convention T	67
2.8. ‘True-in- <i>L</i> ’ Defined in Terms of Satisfaction	70
2.9. How (Tr) Satisfies Convention T and Enables us to Derive ST-Sentences	72
2.10. Schematic Definitions of ‘True-in- <i>L</i> ’ Rejected	74
2.11. Adopting the Tarski–Quine Thesis	78
2.12. Two Objections	79

3. The Intersubjectivity Constraint	82
3.1. A Preliminary Formulation of the Intersubjectivity Constraint	82
3.2. Practical Identifications of Words (PIWs)	84
3.3. Practical Judgements of Sameness of Satisfaction (PJSSs)	87
3.4. Agreement and Disagreement	90
3.5. Learning from Others	93
3.6. Discoveries	94
3.7. A Reformulation of the Intersubjectivity Constraint	95
3.8. Trust without Trustworthiness?	97
3.9. A Quinean Objection: PJSSs are not Factual	98
3.10. Realism as Integral to the Semantics of the Predicate ‘True’	102
 4. How to Think about Words	 105
4.1. Is the Tarski–Quine Thesis Incompatible with the Intersubjectivity Constraint?	105
4.2. Use versus Mention (Transparent Use)	106
4.3. The Orthographic Conception of Words	107
4.4. Explanatory Use (Ex-Use)	108
4.5. The Token-and-Ex-Use Model of Words	112
4.6. Types and Tokens	114
4.7. Kaplan’s Common Currency Conception of Words	120
4.8. The Context Principle and the PJSS-Based Conception of Words	127
4.9. How to Satisfy the Intersubjectivity Constraint without Rejecting the Tarski–Quine Thesis	133
4.10. Preliminary Objections and Replies	140
 5. Learning from Others, Interpretation, and Charity	 144
5.1. Is the Intersubjectivity Constraint Compatible with the Negation of the Tarski–Quine Thesis?	144
5.2. Language Ex-Use and Interpretation	145
5.3. A Case in which One Person Learns from Another	148
5.4. Two Conditionals	151

5.5. Strategy	153
5.6. What is Davidson's Principle of Charity?	154
5.7. Davidson's Framework for Evaluating (3) and (4)	158
5.8. Why the Conjunction of (3) and (4) Violates Davidson's Principle of Charity	160
5.9. My Conclusion Drawn, Generalized, and Explained	165
5.10. Is the Principle of Charity Optional?	169
5.11. An Alternative to Davidson's Principle of Charity	171
5.12. Frontiers of Translation	174
5.13. The Method behind these Conclusions	177
6. A Puzzle about Sameness of Satisfaction across Time	179
6.1. An Intuition about Sameness of Satisfaction across Time	179
6.2. Methodological Analyticity	182
6.3. Causal-Historical Theories	186
6.4. A Thought Experiment	191
6.5. The Standard Conception of the Options for the Thought Experiment	194
6.6. A Preview of why Options (1) and (2) are Unacceptable	196
6.7. A Dilemma for the Causal-Historical Theory	197
6.8. Dispositions	201
6.9. Epistemic Possibilities and Primary Intensions	204
6.10. Problems with Primary Intensions	208
6.11. Implicit Conceptions	213
7. Sense and Partial Extension	217
7.1. Option (3)	217
7.2. Dummett on Sameness of Satisfaction across Time	218
7.3. Dummett on Sense and Implicit Knowledge	220
7.4. Why Dummett's Constraints Rule out Options (1) and (2)	225
7.5. Dummett's Version of Option (3)	228
7.6. Two Problems for Dummett's Version of Option (3)	230
7.7. Field on Partial Extension	236
7.8. A Field-Style Argument against Options (1) and (2)	238
7.9. A Field-Style Defence of Option (3)	240
7.10. A Problem for the Field-Style Defence of Option (3)	241

8. The Puzzle Diagnosed and Dissolved	247
8.1. The Puzzle Reviewed	247
8.2. The First Gold–Platinum Thought Experiment and the Context Principle	249
8.3. The Second Gold–Platinum Thought Experiment	252
8.4. The Thesis that the Extension of a PJSS-Based Word Type is Determined by Facts about the Ex-Uses of Some of its Tokens	257
8.5. George Wilson’s Riverdale Olympics Case	260
8.6. Henry Jackman’s Temporal Externalism	264
8.7. Counterfactuals about the Past and the Third Gold–Platinum Thought Experiment	269
8.8. Temporal Externalism and Relative Truth	276
8.9. Immanent Realism	286
9. Applications and Consequences	288
9.1. Introduction	288
9.2. A Deflationary Alternative to the Causal Theory of Reference: Predicates	289
9.3. A Deflationary Alternative to the Causal Theory of Reference: Proper Names	291
9.4. What is Minimal Self-Knowledge?	294
9.5. Minimal Self-Knowledge as Second Order	295
9.6. Basic Self-Knowledge and Containment	297
9.7. Minimal Self-Knowledge as First Order	303
9.8. Minimal Self-Knowledge as Practical Knowledge	306
9.9. The Division of Epistemic Labour	308
9.10. Judging Minimal Linguistic Competence across Time	311
9.11. Anti-Individualism, Externalism, and Linguistic Communities	313
9.12. Truth and Logic	316
<i>References</i>	320
<i>Index</i>	331