

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
<i>Introduction</i>	x
Part I. Modality	I
1 Particular possibilities	3
1.1 Modal fact realism	3
1.2 Simple modal predication	6
1.3 A problem for simple modal predication	9
1.4 Disparatism vs. non-disparatism	14
1.5 A familiar diagnosis of modal error	17
1.6 Cognitive use vs. cognitive mention	21
1.7 Concluding remarks	24
2 General possibilities	27
2.1 Introductory remarks	27
2.2 Actualism vs. possibilism	30
2.3 Unicorns	33
2.4 Actual past kinds	36
2.5 Potentially future kinds	38
2.6 The larger context of denying assumption (2)	40
2.7 The general and the particular	45
2.8 Concluding remarks	49
Part II. Intentionality	51
3 The intentionality of words	53
3.1 Kaplan's question	53
3.2 The nature of tokens	56
3.3 The nature of referential intentions	59
3.4 Complications	66
3.5 Truth conditions and disquotation	68
Appendix I: Necessity in reference	78
4 Epistemology factualized	81
4.1 Introductory remarks	81
4.2 Two pictures of aboutness	84
4.3 Strict invariance in the epistemic situation	90

viii NECESSARY INTENTIONALITY

4.4	Qualitative invariance in the epistemic situation	95
4.5	Concluding remarks	105
5	Cognitive states as relational	111
5.1	Introductory remarks	111
5.2	Basic cases	117
5.3	The Quine–Kaplan problem	124
5.4	The problem of attitudes towards the non-existent	129
5.5	The problem of generic attitudes	136
5.6	A general feature of the account	151
	Appendix II: Omniscient believing and consistency	157
	<i>Bibliography</i>	167
	<i>Index</i>	172