## Contents

Preface	page xi
Part One The Metaphysical Background	1
1 Persons in the Material World	3
Three Questions	4
Beyond Biology	12
An Overview	20
A Philosophical Stance	22
2 The Very Idea of Constitution	27
A Description of Constitution	29
The Road to Essentialism	35
A Definition of 'Constitution'	39
Having Properties Derivatively	46
Conclusion	58
3 The First-Person Perspective	59
First-Person Phenomena	60
Features of the First-Person Perspective	69
Indispensability of the First-Person Perspective	76
A Look at Other Views	79
Conclusion	88
Part Two The Constitution View Explained	89
4 The Constitution View of Human Persons	91
What a Human Person Is	91
Mental Properties	101

	Theses About Human Persons	105
	My Body/Myself	110
	Conclusion	116
5	Personal Identity over Time	118
	Other Views of Personal Identity over Time	119
	The Constitution View of Personal Identity over Time	132
	Is Bodily Transfer Impossible?	141
	Conclusion	146
6	The Importance of Being a Person	147
	Moral Agency	148
	Rational Agency	158
	Some Cognitive and Practical Capacities	159
	Unity of Consciousness	161
	Conclusion	163
Pa	rt Three The Constitution View Defended	165
7	The Coherence of the Idea of Material Constitution	167
	Constitution and Incoherence	169
	Constitution and Mereology	179
	Constitution and Supervenience	185
	Conclusion	189
8	The Coherence of the Constitution View of	
	Human Persons	191
	Constitution Is Not Mere 'Coincidence'	191
	The "How Many" Problem and Linguistic Incoherence	197
	Is There a "Fetus Problem"?	204
	A Counterexample on Offer	208
	Conclusion	212
9	In Favor of the Constitution View	213
	Yes, Materialism	213
	Dualism and Its Desiderata	216
	Taking Persons Seriously	218
	Materialistic Competitors	222
	Conclusion	228
In	dex	231