

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	x
1 Introduction	1
2 Moore's Attack on Ethical Naturalism	10
3 Emotivism and the Rejection of Non-Naturalism	26
4 Blackburn's Quasi-Realism	52
5 Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism	95
6 Mackie's 'Error-Theory' and the Argument from Queerness	111
7 'Best Opinion' Accounts of Moral Qualities	128
8 Naturalism 1: Cornell Realism	138
9 Naturalism 2: Reductionism	178
10 Contemporary Non-Naturalism: McDowell's Moral Realism	243
<i>Appendix: Sense, Reference, Semantic Value and Truth-Conditions</i>	284
<i>Notes</i>	287
<i>References</i>	305
<i>Index</i>	315