CONTENTS

List of Boxes	xiii
Preface	xv
Introduction	
Part I	
SETS AND NUMBERS	
Naive Sets and Russell's Paradox	3
1.1 Sets	3
1.2 Membership and the Axiom of Extensionality	4
1.3 Unions, Intersections, and the Empty Set	5
1.4 Subsets	6
1.5 Members versus Subsets	6
1.6 Power Sets	8
1.7 The Axiom of Comprehension	9
1.8 Russell's Set	10
1.9 Russell's Paradox	11
1.10 Barbers and Sets	12
1.11 Alternatives to Naive Set Theory	13
Further Reading	15
Exercises	15
2 Infinite Sets	17
2.1 Some Infinite Sets	17
2.2 Different Kinds of Numbers	18

	2.3 Two Senses of 'More'	20
	2.4 Denumerability	22
	2.5 More Denumerable Sets	24
	2.6 The Non-Denumerability of the Real Numbers	25
	2.7 The Abundance of the Real Numbers	27
	Further Reading	28
	Exercises	28
3	Orders of Infinity	30
	3.1 Some Harder Stuff	30
	3.2 The Numerical Size of Sets	30
	3.3 The Reals and the Power Set of the Natural Numbers	32
	3.4 The Continuum Hypothesis	35
	3.5 An Infinity of Infinities	36
	3.6 The Generalized Continuum Hypothesis	38
	Further Reading	40
	Exercises	40

Part II

ANALYTICITY, A PRIORICITY, AND NECESSITY

4	t Kinds of Truths	
	4.1 Three Distinctions among Truths	45
	4.2 Analytic and Synthetic	45
	4.3 A Priori and A Posteriori	46
	4.4 Synthetic A Prioris	47
	4.5 How is Synthetic A Priori Knowledge Possible?	49
	4.6 Pure and Applied Geometry	50
	Further Reading	56
	Exercises	56
5	Possible Worlds	58
	5.1 Necessity and Contingency	58
	5.2 A Posteriori Necessities	59

5.3	A Priori Contingencies	60
5.4	Possibility and Necessity	61
5.5	Possible Worlds	62
5.6	Necessity and Possibility in terms of Worlds	63
5.7	Constraints on Possible Worlds	64
5.8	Essential Properties	66
5.9	The Nature of Necessity	67
5.10	Different Kinds of Possibility	68
Further Reading		70
Exer	rcises	70
Nar	ning and Necessity	72
6.1	Two Readings of Statements of Necessity	72
6.2	Scope Distinctions	73
6.3	Julius and the Inventor of the Zip	74
6.4	Rigid Designators	75
6.5	The Causal Theory of Reference	76
6.6	Rigidity and the Causal Theory	77
6.7	De Dicto and De Re	78
6.8	Necessary and A Priori Again	80
6.9	A Limit to Scepticism about A Posteriori Necessity	81
Furt	her Reading	85
Exer	rcises	85
	Part III	
	THE NATURE AND USES OF PROBABILITY	
Kind	ds of Probability	89
		89
	5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 Furt Exer 0.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 Furt Exer Kino	 F.4 Possibility and Necessity 5.5 Possible Worlds 5.6 Necessity and Possibility in terms of Worlds 5.7 Constraints on Possible Worlds 5.8 Essential Properties 5.9 The Nature of Necessity 5.10 Different Kinds of Possibility Further Reading Exercises Naming and Necessity 6.1 Two Readings of Statements of Necessity 6.2 Scope Distinctions 6.3 Julius and the Inventor of the Zip 6.4 Rigid Designators 6.5 The Causal Theory of Reference 6.6 Rigidity and the Causal Theory 6.7 De Dicto and De Re 6.8 Necessary and A Priori Again 6.9 A Limit to Scepticism about A Posteriori Necessity Further Reading Exercises

7.3	Some Consequences
7.4	Joint Probabilities
7.5	Subjective and Objective Probabilities

7.2 Kolmogorov's Axioms

7

ix

	7.6 Subjective Probability	95
	7.7 Action, Utility, and Subjective Probability	96
	7.8 Dutch Books	98
	7.9 Objective Probability	99
	Further Reading	102
	Exercises	102
		102
8	Constraints on Credence	104
	8.1 The Principal Principle	104
	8.2 Conditional Probability	106
	8.3 Updating Degrees of Belief—Conditionalization	107
	8.4 Bayes' Theorem	109
	8.5 Conditional Probabilities and Conditional Statements	110
	8.6 Material Conditionals	111
	8.7 Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals	114
	8.8 Rational and Metaphysical Changes	115
	Further Reading	117
	Exercises	117
9	Correlations and Causes	119
	9.1 Probabilistic Independence	119
	9.2 Probabilistic Dependence	120
	9.3 Correlation	121
	9.4 Causation and Correlation	122
	9.5 Screening Off	123
	9.6 Spurious Correlations	124
	9.7 Randomized Experiments	125
	9.8 Survey Research	127
	9.9 Simpson's Paradox	129
	Further Reading	131
	Exercises	131

Part IV LOGICS AND THEORIES

10	Synt	ax and Semantics	137
	10.1	Validity	137
	10.2	Logic and Metalogic	138
	10.3	Different Kinds of Logic	139
	10.4	Truth-Functional Connectives	139
	10.5	Syntax and Semantics	142
	10.6	Syntactic Consequence	143
	10.7	Semantic Consequence	144
	Furt	her Reading	148
	Exer	cises	148
II	Soundness and Completeness		149
	11.1	Soundness and Completeness	149
	11.2	Proving Soundness and Completeness	150
	11.3	Reflections on Circularity	151
	11.4	Predicate Logic	153
	11.5	Predicate Syntax	154
	11.6	Predicate Semantics	156
	11.7	Predicate Logic—Soundness and Completeness	157
	11.8	Predicate Logic—Undecidability	157
	11.9	Second-Order Logic	159
	11.10	The Incompleteness of Second-Order Logic	161
	Furt	ner Reading	163
12	Theo	ries and Gödel's Theorem	164
	12.1	Theories	164
	12.2	Syntax and Semantics for Theories	165
	12.3	Theoretical Completeness	166

12.4	4 Completeness for Theories versus Completeness	
	for Logics	168
12.5	Gödel's Theorem Stated	169
12.6	A Sketch of Gödel's Proof	170
12.7	The Inescapability of Gödel's Theorem	173
12.8	Meta-Theorizing	174
Furt	her Reading 17	
Solu	tions to Exercises	179
Index		189