

# Contents

Preface	x
1 What is the Moral Problem?	1
1.1 Normative Ethics vs. Meta-Ethics	1
1.2 Meta-Ethics Today	3
1.3 The Moral Problem	4
1.4 Towards a Solution to the Moral Problem	13
1.5 Summary and Preview	14
2 The Expressivist Challenge	16
2.1 Descriptivism vs. Expressivism	16
2.2 An Apparent Dilemma Facing Descriptivists	17
2.3 Ayer's Objection to Non-Naturalism	20
2.4 Non-Naturalism and Epistemology	21
2.5 Ayer's Objection to Naturalism	25
2.6 The Open Question Argument and Metaphysical Naturalism	27
2.7 The Open Question Argument and Definitional Naturalism	35
2.8 What are the Platitudes Surrounding our Moral Concepts?	39
2.9 Subjective vs. Non-Subjective Definitional Naturalism	41
2.10 Definitional Naturalism as the Search for Network Analyses of our Moral Concepts	44
2.11 How Network Analyses can be Defective: The Permutation Problem	48

2.12	Can We Provide Network Analyses of Moral Terms?	54
2.13	Can We Avoid Ayer's Dilemma?	56
2.14	Summary and Preview	58
3	The Externalist Challenge	60
3.1	Internalism vs. Externalism	60
3.2	Rationalism as a Conceptual Claim vs. Rationalism as a Substantive Claim	63
3.3	Brink's 'Amoralist' Challenge	66
3.4	Reply to Brink's Claim that Amoralists Really Make Moral Judgments	68
3.5	An Argument for the Practicality Requirement	71
3.6	Foot's 'Etiquette' Challenge	77
3.7	Reply to Foot's Claim that Morality and Etiquette are Analogous	80
3.8	Reply to Foot's Objection to the Rationalists' Conceptual Claim	84
3.9	An Argument for the Rationalists' Conceptual Claim	85
3.10	Summary and Preview	91
4	The Humean Theory of Motivation	92
4.1	Two Principles	92
4.2	Motivating Reasons vs. Normative Reasons	94
4.3	A Preliminary Objection from Nagel	98
4.4	Why Should We Believe the Humean Theory?	101
4.5	Desires and Phenomenology	104
4.6	Desires, Directions of Fit and Dispositions	111
4.7	Desires, Directions of Fit, Goals and Motivating Reasons	116
4.8	Summary of the Entire Argument So Far and Preview	125
5	An Anti-Humean Theory of Normative Reasons	130
5.1	From Motivating Reasons to Normative Reasons	130
5.2	The Intentional and the Deliberative	131

5.3	Some Differences between Valuing and Desiring	133
5.4	The Puzzle	136
5.5	Davidson on Valuing as Desiring	137
5.6	Gauthier on Valuing as a Mode of Desiring	141
5.7	Lewis on Valuing as Desiring to Desire	142
5.8	Valuing as Believing	147
5.9	The Analysis of Normative Reasons	151
5.10	The Puzzle Solved	177
5.11	Summary and Preview	180
6	How to Solve the Moral Problem	182
6.1	An Analysis of Rightness in Terms of Facts about our Normative Reasons	182
6.2	The Solution to the Moral Problem	184
6.3	Are There Any Moral Facts?	187
6.4	How the Analysis of Rightness Enables Us to Reply to Standard Objections to Rationalism	189
6.5	Conclusion	201
	Notes	203
	References	216
	Index	223