

Contents

Contributors	ix
Introduction	3
TORIN ALTER AND SVEN WALTER	

Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge

1. What RoboMary Knows 15
DANIEL DENNETT
2. So *This* Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis 32
LAURENCE NEMIROW
3. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness,
Representationalism 52
FRANK JACKSON
4. Does Representationalism Undermine
the Knowledge Argument? 65
TORIN ALTER
5. What Is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally
Color-Blind Person Know about Color? 77
KNUT NORDBY

Part Two: Phenomenal Concepts

6. What Is a Phenomenal Concept? 87
JANET LEVIN
7. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts 111
DAVID PAPINEAU
8. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 145
JOSEPH LEVINE
9. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap 167
DAVID J. CHALMERS

10. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia 195
JOHN HAWTHORNE
11. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and
the Semantic Premise 210
STEPHEN L. WHITE
12. Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity 249
NED BLOCK
13. Grasping Phenomenal Properties 307
MARTINE NIDA-RÜMELIN
- Index 339