

# Contents

Preface	ix
Introduction	1
1 MORALITY – INVENTION OR DISCOVERY?	3
1.1 Two views of morality	3
1.2 Justification and truth	5
1.3 Moral realism	7
1.4 Moral non-cognitivism	8
1.5 Moral freedom and the meaning of life	10
1.6 Realism, non-cognitivism and the moral tradition	13
1.7 Morality and ethical theory	15
2 MORAL NON-COGNITIVISM – AN OUTLINE	17
2.1 Fact and value – the great divide	17
2.2 Four challenges to non-cognitivism	18
2.3 Explanation of action and moral motivation	20
2.4 Moral language	24
2.5 Truth	30
2.6 Justification and scepticism	32
2.7 Observation	35
2.8 Reality and appearance	35
2.9 Conclusion	37
3 MORAL REALISM – AN OUTLINE	39
3.1 The presumption of realism	39
3.2 Moral reality	41
3.3 Moral motivation	46
3.4 Truth and meaning	50

3.5	Observation	55
3.6	Justification	57
3.7	Science and reality	62
3.8	Conclusion	64
<b>4</b>	<b>NON-COGNITIVISM – FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS</b>	<b>66</b>
4.1	A perceptual analogy	66
4.2	The absolute conception of reality	68
4.3	Moral properties as secondary qualities	71
4.4	The new theory and the old	74
4.5	Truth	75
4.6	Observation	77
4.7	Is the new theory non-cognitivist?	78
4.8	Motivation and the corrected point of view	80
<b>5</b>	<b>REALISM AND REALITY</b>	<b>83</b>
5.1	Bare reality	83
5.2	Absolute reality	84
5.3	Perception and reality	89
5.4	Explanation and projection	91
5.5	Mind-independent reality	94
<b>6</b>	<b>THE STATE OF THE DEBATE – AN INTERIM REPORT</b>	<b>98</b>
6.1	Quasi-realism and the error theory	98
6.2	Irrealism about moral properties	99
6.3	Choice of ethical theory	103
<b>7</b>	<b>MORAL MOTIVATION</b>	<b>106</b>
7.1	A defence of the belief–desire theory	106
7.2	A cognitivist account of desire	110
7.3	Cognitivism and caring	113
7.4	The authority of moral requirements	114
7.5	Moral virtue	115
<b>8</b>	<b>MORAL WEAKNESS</b>	<b>118</b>
8.1	Moral weakness	118
8.2	Weakness of will	120
8.3	A condition for an adequate account of weakness of will	122

8.4	Weakness and the belief–desire theory	123
8.5	Non-cognitivism and moral weakness	126
8.6	Cognitive theories of motivation and moral weakness	127
8.7	Postscript: Free, explicable but irrational action	132
9	AMORALISM AND WICKEDNESS	134
9.1	Why amoralism and wickedness threaten internalism	134
9.2	A non-cognitivist response	136
9.3	An internalist realist response	137
9.4	An externalist response	138
9.5	Internalism and amoralism	139
9.6	Internalism and wickedness	140
9.7	The bad person	144
10	MORAL REALISM AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY	147
10.1	Disagreement and scepticism	147
10.2	Social worlds	149
10.3	A realist response	150
10.4	Understanding the natives	152
10.5	Critical reflection	155
10.6	Particularism and justification	157
10.7	Insight and tolerance	159
11	NON-COGNITIVISM AND UTILITARIANISM	163
11.1	Ethics and moral theory	163
11.2	Utilitarianism	164
11.3	Utilitarianism and the ideal spectator theory	166
11.4	Consistency and utilitarianism	168
11.5	Preferences, decision procedures and happiness	171
11.6	The debate about utilitarianism	175
12	QUASI-REALISM	182
12.1	The prospects for quasi-realism	182
12.2	Quasi-realism defended	183
12.3	A realist response	186
13	PRINCIPLES OR PARTICULARISM?	190
13.1	The role of moral principles	190
13.2	Moral conflict	194

13.3 Particularism and prima facie duties	200
13.4 Moral principles in ordinary life	201
13.5 Moral experts and moral teachers	203
References	206
Index	210