

Contents

<i>Editors' introduction</i>	ix
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PART I PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

1 Infinite regress and foundations of mathematics	3
Introduction	3
1 Stopping infinite regress in science	4
2 Stopping infinite regress by the logico-trivialization of mathematics	10
3 Stopping infinite regress by a trivial meta-theory	20
2 A renaissance of empiricism in the recent philosophy of mathematics?	24
Introduction	24
1 Empiricism and induction: the new vogue in mathematical philosophy?	25
2 Quasi-empirical versus Euclidean theories	28
3 Mathematics is quasi-empirical	30
4 'Potential falsifiers' in mathematics	35
5 Periods of stagnation in the growth of quasi-empirical theories	41
3 Cauchy and the continuum: the significance of non-standard analysis for the history and philosophy of mathematics (edited by J. P. Cleave)	43
1 Non-standard analysis suggests a radical reassessment of the history of the infinitesimal calculus	43
2 Cauchy and the problem of uniform convergence	45
3 A new solution	47
4 What caused the downfall of Leibniz's theory?	53
5 Was Cauchy a 'forerunner' of Robinson?	55
6 Metaphysical versus technical	58
7 Appraisal of mathematical theories	59
4 What does a mathematical proof prove?	61
5 The method of analysis-synthesis	70
1 Analysis-synthesis: a pattern of Euclidean heuristic and its criticism	70
(a) Prologue on analysis and synthesis	70
(b) Analysis-synthesis and heuristic	72
(c) The Cartesian Circuit and its breakdown	75
(c1) The Circuit is neither empiricist nor intellectualist. The source of knowledge is the Circuit as a whole	77

CONTENTS

(c2) Induction and deduction in the Circuit	79
(c3) The continuity between Pappus and Descartes	83
(c4) The Cartesian Circuit in mathematics	88
(c5) The breakdown of the Cartesian Circuit	88
2 Analysis-synthesis: how failed attempts at refutations may be heuristic starting points of research programmes	93
(a) An analysis-synthesis in topology which does not prove what it sets out to prove	93
(b) An analysis-synthesis in physics which does not explain what it set out to explain	97
(c) Pappusian analyses-syntheses in Greek geometry	99
(d) [False awareness about analysis-synthesis]	101

PART 2 CRITICAL PAPERS

6 The problem of appraising scientific theories: three approaches	107
1 Three main schools of thought concerning the normative problem of appraising scientific theories	107
(a) Scepticism	107
(b) Demarcationism	108
(c) Elitism	111
2 Elitism and allied philosophical positions	112
(a) Elitists for psychologism and/or sociologism	112
(b) Elitists for authoritarianism and historicism	116
(c) Elitists for pragmatism	117
7 Necessity, Kneale and Popper	121
1 The ontological level	121
2 The epistemological-methodological level	124
3 The continuity of logical and natural necessity	126
8 Changes in the problem of inductive logic	128
Introduction	128
1 The two main problems of classical empiricism: inductive justification and inductive method	129
2 The one main problem of neoclassical empiricism: weak inductive justification (degree of confirmation)	131
3 The weak and strong atheoretical theses	138
(a) Carnap abandons the Jeffreys-Keynes postulate. Qualified instance confirmation versus confirmation	138
(b) The weak atheoretical thesis: confirmation theory without theories	142
(c) The conflation of the weak and the strong atheoretical theses	145
(d) The interconnection between the weak and strong atheoretical theses	147
(e) A Carnapian logic of discovery	149
4 Probability, evidential support, rational belief and betting quotients	151
(a) Are degrees of evidential support probabilities?	152
(b) Are 'degrees of rational belief' degrees of evidential support or are they rational betting quotients?	157
(c) Are rational betting quotients probabilities?	159

CONTENTS

5	The collapse of the weak atheoretical thesis	160
	(a) 'Correctness of language' and confirmation theory	160
	(b) The abdication of the inductive judge	165
6	The one main problem of critical empiricism: method	170
	(a) 'Acceptability ₁ '	170
	(b) 'Acceptability ₂ '	173
	(c) 'Acceptability ₃ '	181
7	Theoretical support for predictions versus (test)-evidential support for theories	192
	Appendix. On Popper's three notes on degree of corroboration	193
9	On Popperian historiography	201
	Appendix on 'ultra-falsificationism'	208
10	Anomalies versus 'crucial experiments' (a rejoinder to Professor Grünbaum)	211
	Introduction	211
1	There have been no crucial experiments in science	211
2	The impossibility of Grünbaumian crucial experiments and the possibility of appraising scientific growth without them	216
3	On practical advice	218
4	The characteristic of science is not rational belief but rational replacement of propositions	220
11	Understanding Toulmin	224
	Introduction	224
1	Three schools of thought on the normative problem of appraising scientific theories	225
2	Toulmin and the Wittgensteinian 'thought-police'	228
3	Toulmin's Darwinian synthesis of Hegel and Wittgenstein	235
4	Conclusion	241
PART 3 SCIENCE AND EDUCATION		
12	A letter to the Director of the London School of Economics	247
13	The teaching of the history of science	254
14	The social responsibility of science	256
	<i>References</i>	259
	<i>Lakatos bibliography</i>	274
	<i>Indexes</i>	277