Contents

Preface	ix
Introduction	
0.1 Overview	I
0.2 Chapter Summaries	3
0.3 Use of Terms	8
1. The Nature of Testimony	13
1.1 Preliminary Remarks	13
1.2 The Narrow View	I 4
1.3 The Broad View	19
1.4 The Moderate View	23
1.5 General Problems	25
1.6 The Disjunctive View	27
2. Rejecting Transmission	37
2.1 The Belief View of Testimony	37
2.2 The Transmission of Epistemic Properties	39
2.3 The Necessity Thesis	47
2.4 The Sufficiency Thesis	65
3. A Defense of Learning from Words	72
3.1 The Statement View of Testimony	72
3.2 Objection to Counterexamples	77
3.3 Objection to RS-N	79
3.4 Objection to Approach	97
4. Norms of Assertion and Testimonial Knowledge	103
4.1 The Knowledge Norm of Assertion	103
4.2 Two Initial Objections	107
4.3 Selfless Assertion	110
4.4 Objections and Replies	114
4.5 The Spuriousness of Secondary Propriety/Impropriety	118
4.6 The Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion	124

vi CONTENTS

	4.7 Counterexamples to the RTBNA	129
	4.8 Concluding Remarks	139
5.	A Critique of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism	141
	5.1 Preliminary Remarks	141
	5.2 Reductionism	142
	5.3 Non-Reductionism	155
6.	Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony	176
	6.1 Dualism	176
	6.2 The Scarcity of Information Objection	178
	6.3 The Circularity Objection	185
	6.4 The Generalization Problem	188
	6.5 Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism	193
7.	Positive Reasons, Defeaters, and the Infant/Child Objection	195
	7.1 The Infant/Child Objection	195
	7.2 Trivial and Substantive Satisfaction	197
	7.3 Negative Reasons and Counterevidence	200
	7.4 Non-Reductionism and Psychological Defeaters	204
	7.5 A Version of the ICO for Non-Reductionism	207
	7.6 Why the Situation is Even Worse for	
	Non-Reductionism	209
	7.7 Infants, Children, and Their Cognitive Environment	212
	7.8 Why the Situation is Even Better for Reductionism and	
	Dualism	216
8.	Trust and Assurance: The Interpersonal View of Testimony	221
	8.1 The IVT	221
	8.2 The First Horn of the Dilemma	222
	8.3 The Second Horn of the Dilemma	230
	8.4 The Reasons Generated by Trust Argument	240
	8.5 Concluding Remarks	248
Ap	oendix: Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source	251
	A.1 The Preservation View of Memory	251
	A.2 Normative Defeaters	253
	A.3 Psychological Defeaters	257
	A.4 Lack of Belief	263
	A & Changes in Environments Consumer and Enistemic	268

	CONTENTS	vii
A.6 Forgotten Evidence and Forgotten Defeaters		270
A.7 Prima Facie and Ultima Facie Justification		273
A.8 Concluding Remarks		275
References		278
Index		289