

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION1
 - I-1 Why Bother?1
 - I-2 Outline.....6
 - I-3 Sources.....7

- II. CONCEPTS13
 - II-1 Evidentness13
 - II-2 Logical Probability22
 - II-3 Propositions and Conceptual Content30
 - II-4 Logical Possibility.....32
 - II-5 Analyticity36
 - II-6 The Trinity Doctrine46
 - II-7 Christianity57
 - II-8 Public Evidentness63
 - II-9 Psychological Impossibility.....67

- III. TWO ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE TRINITY DOCTRINE
FROM WEAK MODAL SCEPTICISM.....83
 - III-1 Argument I:
Logical Probability of the Entailed.....86
 - III-2 Argument II:
Logical Possibility of the Entailed101
 - III-3 The Arguments in Symbols105
 - III-3.1 ARGUMENT I106
 - III-3.2 ARGUMENT II.....115

IV. A DEFENCE OF WEAK MODAL SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE TRINITY DOCTRINE.....	119
IV-1 The Logical Possibility of the Trinity Doctrine Publicly Evident from its Truth?.....	124
IV-1.1 NOT FROM TESTIMONY?	124
IV-1.1.1 A Priori?	125
IV-1.1.1.1 Self-Evidently?	125
IV-1.1.1.2 By Argument? Swinburne's Case from Perfect Love ..	126
IV-1.1.2 A Posteriori?	139
IV-1.1.2.1 Self-Evidently?.....	139
IV-1.1.2.2 By Argument? Swinburne's Case Again	139
IV-1.2 FROM TESTIMONY?	143
IV-1.2.1 Reasons of Ramified Natural Theology?.....	145
IV-1.2.2 Leslie's Case from Public Monuments?	150
IV-2 The Logical Possibility of the Trinity Doctrine Publicly Evident Not from its Truth?	156
IV-2.1 NOT FROM TESTIMONY?	156
IV-2.1.1 A Priori?.....	157
IV-2.1.1.1 Self-Evidently?.....	158
IV-2.1.1.1a Modal Epistemology?.....	158
IV-2.1.1.1b The Supposit Theory?.....	165
IV-2.1.1.2 By Argument?.....	172
IV-2.1.1.2a Van Inwagen's Case?	172
IV-2.1.1.2b Swinburne's Case? (One Last Time)	186
IV-2.1.2 A Posteriori? Mundane Analogies.....	189
IV-2.2 FROM TESTIMONY?	196
IV-2.2.1 Failure of Arguments to the Contrary?	196
IV-2.2.2 Probabilistic Confirmation?	197
IV-2.2.3 The Insufficiency of Testimony	201
IV-3 The Generalizing Step.....	210
IV-4 Additional Note: Evident from Religious Experience?.....	216
IV-5 The Modal Step	220

V. TWO CONSTRAINTS ON LOGICAL PROBABILITY	231
V-1 Keynes's Wavering	231
V-2 Franklin's Triangle Argument	233
V-2.1 BERNOULLIAN INDUCTION	235
V-2.2 A BERNOULLIAN TRIANGLE ARGUMENT	237
V-3 Logical Omniscience	241
VI. OTHER QUESTIONS	243
VI-1 Epistemic Justification	244
VI-2 Fine Argument	247
VI-3 Other Probability	254
VI-3.1 KINDS OF PROBABILITY	254
VI-3.2 HUMANLY RATIONAL CREDENCE.....	260
VI-3.3 BLAMELESS CREDENCE	267
VII. CONCLUSIONS	273
VII-1 Summing Up	273
VII-2 So What?	277
BIBLIOGRAPHY	281
APPENDIX	308
INDEX OF PERSONS	311
GENERAL INDEX	316