

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> vii
INTRODUCTION	I
I. FIELDS OF ARGUMENT AND MODALS	II
The Phases of an Argument	15
Impossibilities and Improperities	22
Force and Criteria	30
The Field-Dependence of our Standards	36
Questions for the Agenda	38
II. PROBABILITY	44
I know, I promise, Probably	47
'Improbable but true'	53
Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims	57
The Labyrinth of Probability	62
Probability and Expectation	66
Probability-Relations and Probabilification	71
Is the Word 'Probability' Ambiguous?	75
Probability-Theory and Psychology	84
The Development of our Probability-Concepts	89
III. THE LAYOUT OF ARGUMENTS	94
The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants	97
The Pattern of an Argument: Backing our Warrants	103
Ambiguities in the Syllogism	107
The Notion of 'Universal Premisses'	113
The Notion of Formal Validity	118
Analytic and Substantial Arguments	123
The Peculiarities of Analytic Arguments	127

III. THE LAYOUT OF ARGUMENTS (<i>cont.</i>)	
Some Crucial Distinctions	<i>page</i> 135
The Perils of Simplicity	141
IV. WORKING LOGIC AND IDEALISED LOGIC	146
An Hypothesis and its Consequences	147
The Verification of this Hypothesis	154
The Irrelevance of Analytic Criteria	166
Logical Modalities	169
Logic as a System of Eternal Truths	177
System-Building and Systematic Necessity	188
V. THE ORIGINS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORY	211
Further Consequences of our Hypothesis	217
Can Substantial Arguments be Redeemed? I: Transcendentalism	223
Can Substantial Arguments be Redeemed? II: Phenomenalism and Scepticism	229
Substantial Arguments Do Not Need Redeeming	232
The Justification of Induction	235
Intuition and the Mechanism of Cognition	240
The Irrelevance of the Analytic Ideal	248
CONCLUSION	253
<i>References</i>	260
<i>Index.</i> 1. Proper names	263
2. Terms introduced or discussed	264