

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Meinong's Life and Philosophy</b> . . . . .	1
1.1	The Brentano School . . . . .	1
1.2	Biographical Sketch . . . . .	1
1.3	Meinong's Apprenticeship to Brentano . . . . .	3
1.4	Intentionality Thesis in Descriptive Philosophical Psychology . . . . .	7
1.5	Logic and Phenomenology: Höfler, Meinong, and Twardowski on the Act-Content-Object Structure of Thought . . . . .	9
1.6	<i>Gegenstandstheorie</i> : Existent and Nonexistent Objects . . . .	12
1.7	Ontic Neutrality in Logic and Semantics: Problems for Meinong's Object Theory . . . . .	17
1.8	<i>Werttheorie</i> : Values in Emotional Presentation . . . . .	20
1.9	Meinong's Philosophy in the Brentanian Legacy . . . . .	22
<b>2</b>	<b>Origins of <i>Gegenstandstheorie</i>: Immanent and Transcendent Intended Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong</b> . . . .	25
2.1	Immanent Objectivity . . . . .	25
2.2	Immanence in a Closed Circle of Ideas . . . . .	26
2.3	Twardowski's Content-Object Distinction . . . . .	29
2.4	Mind-Independence Beyond Being and Non-Being . . . . .	32
2.5	Brentano's Later Reism . . . . .	34
<b>3</b>	<b>Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption</b> . . . . .	41
3.1	On Intentionality . . . . .	41
3.2	Meinong's Intentionalist Object Theory . . . . .	44
3.3	Phenomenology and the Meinongian Domain . . . . .	46
3.4	Inner Perception and Unrestricted Freedom of Assumption . .	48
3.5	From Intentionality to Intensionality, Phenomenology to Object Theory . . . . .	53

<b>4</b>	<b><i>Außersein</i> of the Pure Object . . . . .</b>	<b>59</b>
4.1	Beyond Being and Non-Being . . . . .	59
4.2	Ontology of Reference and Predication . . . . .	62
4.3	From <i>Quasisein</i> to <i>Außersein</i> . . . . .	64
4.4	Russell's Being-Predication Thesis . . . . .	68
4.5	Toward an Analysis of <i>Außersein</i> . . . . .	70
4.6	Husserl's <i>Epoché</i> and Meinong's <i>Außersein</i> . . . . .	74
4.7	Meinong's <i>Außersein</i> and Quine's Critique of Beingless Objects . . . . .	75
<b>5</b>	<b>Constitutive (Nuclear) and Extraconstitutive (Extranuclear) Properties . . . . .</b>	<b>83</b>
5.1	Fundamental Division . . . . .	83
5.2	Sources and Background of Meinong's Distinction . . . . .	85
5.3	Definitions . . . . .	88
5.4	Findlay . . . . .	90
5.5	Parsons . . . . .	92
5.6	Routley . . . . .	93
5.7	Logical Criteria for Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties . . . . .	95
5.8	Existent Round Square, Watering-Down, and the Modal Moment . . . . .	98
5.9	Converse Intentional Properties . . . . .	102
5.10	Nuclear and Extranuclear Predications in the Logic of Fiction . . . . .	105
5.11	Nuclear-Extranuclear Properties and Dual Modes of Predication . . . . .	107
<b>6</b>	<b>Meditations on Meinong's Golden Mountain . . . . .</b>	<b>111</b>
6.1	Reference, Predication and Existence . . . . .	111
6.2	On the Lowland Geography of Denotation . . . . .	115
6.3	Russell's (Mis-) Interpretation of Meinong . . . . .	119
6.4	Russell's Concept of Being . . . . .	127
6.5	Base Camp on the Slopes of Meinong's Golden Mountain . . . . .	132
6.6	Meinongian Intensionalist Logic of Definite Descriptions . . . . .	137
6.7	At the Summit: Meinongian Critique of Russellian Definite Description . . . . .	141
<b>7</b>	<b>Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory . . . . .</b>	<b>145</b>
7.1	Intended Objects in a Referential Domain . . . . .	145
7.2	<i>Grundideen</i> of Meinongian Object Theory . . . . .	146
7.3	Meinongian Intensional versus Fregean Extensional Reference Domains . . . . .	147
7.4	Comprehension Principle for Meinongian Object Theory . . . . .	151
7.5	Russell's Problem of the Existent Golden Mountain . . . . .	152

7.6	Converse Intentional Properties as Intensional Identity Conditions . . . . .	153
7.7	Synthesis of Alternative Complementary Solutions to Russell's Problem . . . . .	155
7.8	Mind-Independent Objectivity of the Meinongian Domain . . . . .	159
<b>8</b>	<b>Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Non-Being . . . . .</b>	<b>163</b>
8.1	Intertwining of Objects . . . . .	163
8.2	Implexive Being, Non-Being, and So-Being . . . . .	165
8.3	Formal Neo-Meinongian Theory of Implection . . . . .	169
8.4	Meinongian Implection and Aristotelian Inherence . . . . .	171
8.5	Objections to Meinong's Jungle . . . . .	177
8.6	On Defoliating Meinong's Jungle . . . . .	181
8.7	Aristotelian Realism and the Parmenidean One in Meinong's Object Theory Logic and Semantics . . . . .	188
<b>9</b>	<b>About Nothing . . . . .</b>	<b>193</b>
9.1	Intentionality . . . . .	193
9.2	Thinking About Nothing(ness) . . . . .	194
9.3	Intentionality and a Strong Intentionality Thesis . . . . .	196
9.4	Advantageous Semantic Resources of Intensional Logic . . . . .	198
9.5	Intentionality and Intensional Logic . . . . .	200
9.6	Intendability as a Constitutive Property of Intended Objects . . . . .	202
9.7	Analysis of Intendable <i>N</i> -Nothing(ness) . . . . .	211
9.8	<i>N</i> -Nothing(ness) Constitutive Only of <i>N</i> -Nothing(ness) . . . . .	219
9.9	Can We Think About or Otherwise Intend <i>N</i> -Nothing(ness)? . . . . .	222
9.10	Philosophical Applications of Intendable <i>N</i> -Nothing(ness) . . . . .	223
9.11	Nothing Never Nothings. It Does Nothing of the Sort . . . . .	226
<b>10</b>	<b>Tarski's Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains . . . . .</b>	<b>229</b>
10.1	Model Sets and Intended Objects . . . . .	229
10.2	Tarski's Analysis of Logical Truth . . . . .	229
10.3	Counterexamples in Etchemendy's Critique . . . . .	230
10.4	Reduction Principle for Tarski's Quantificational Criterion . . . . .	233
10.5	Logical and Extralogical Terms, Vacuous and Nonvacuous Closure . . . . .	235
10.6	Etchemendy's Philosophical Objections to the Reduction Principle . . . . .	237
10.7	Contingency and Variation in Meinongian and Extensional Semantic Domains . . . . .	240

10.8	Meinongian Object Theory as the Proper Application of Tarskian Quantificational Semantics . . . . .	244
10.9	Non-Meinongian Revision of Tarki's Reduction Principle . . . . .	245
<b>11</b>	<b>Reflections on Mally's Heresy . . . . .</b>	<b>247</b>
11.1	Mally's Heresy . . . . .	247
11.2	Overview of Zalta's Distinction . . . . .	248
11.3	Historical Roots of Meinongian Logic . . . . .	249
11.4	Dual Modes of Predication and Constitutive-Extraconstitutive Properties . . . . .	251
11.5	Encoding-Exemplification Ambiguities . . . . .	251
11.6	Identity Problems for Zalta Objects . . . . .	254
11.7	Amended Reduction of Zalta's Distinction . . . . .	255
11.8	Fine's Correspondence Argument and Zalta's General Counter criticism of Reduction Strategies . . . . .	257
<b>12</b>	<b>Virtual Relations and Meinongian Abstractions . . . . .</b>	<b>263</b>
12.1	Ontology Game . . . . .	263
12.2	Russell's Argument for Relations as Universals . . . . .	264
12.3	Relations and Relational Properties . . . . .	266
12.4	Reference to and Existence of Relations . . . . .	269
12.5	Ontic Neutrality and Epistemic Limitations . . . . .	271
12.6	Virtual Relations as Ontically Neutral Intended Objects . . . . .	273
<b>13</b>	<b>Truth and Fiction in Lewis's Critique of Meinongian Semantics . . . . .</b>	<b>277</b>
13.1	Semantics of Fiction . . . . .	277
13.2	Lewis's Challenge to Meinong . . . . .	278
13.3	Real and Fictional Objects and Properties . . . . .	280
13.4	Indefinitely Numbered Fictional Objects . . . . .	282
13.5	Definitely Numbered Indistinguishable Fictional Objects . . . . .	283
13.6	Quantifier Restrictions in Meinongian Semantics . . . . .	286
13.7	Inferences for Meinongian and Existent Objects . . . . .	288
13.8	Limitations of Lewis-Style Story Contexting . . . . .	292
13.9	Lewis's Modal Analysis of Fictional Worlds . . . . .	294
13.10	Toward a Universal Semantics of Fiction and Nonfiction . . . . .	299
<b>14</b>	<b>Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke's 1973 John Locke Lectures . . . . .</b>	<b>301</b>
14.1	Kripke's Locke Lectures . . . . .	301
14.2	Meaning of Fiction and Realm of Modality . . . . .	302
14.3	Kripke's Actualist Semantic Analysis of Fiction . . . . .	306

14.4	Actualism Versus Meinongianism in Semantics of Fiction . . . . .	307
14.5	Kripkean Actualism in the Semantics of Modal Logic and Fictional Discourse . . . . .	309
14.6	Intentionality of Pretending in the Meaning of Fiction . . . . .	311
14.7	Leibnizian Identity Conditions for Fictional Objects . . . . .	314
14.8	Intentionality and Intending Fictional Objects . . . . .	316
14.9	Ontic Neutrality of Identity Conditions for Fictional Intended Objects . . . . .	320
14.10	Equivocal Ontic Status of Kripkean Fictional Characters . . . . .	324
<b>15</b>	<b>Metaphysics of Meinongian Aesthetic Value . . . . .</b>	<b>329</b>
15.1	Aesthetic Value . . . . .	329
15.2	Witasek's Aesthetics in Meinong's Graz School . . . . .	330
15.3	Aesthetic Values as Meinongian Objects . . . . .	331
15.4	Essentials of Meinongian Object Theory for Aesthetics . . . . .	333
15.5	Meinongian Metaphysics of Aesthetic Objects and Values . . . . .	336
15.6	Danto Aesthetic Value Puzzle . . . . .	340
15.7	Objective Aesthetic Value Attributions . . . . .	344
15.8	Vindicating Meinong's Subjectivity of Aesthetic Value . . . . .	346
15.9	Aesthetic Value and the Indisputability of Taste . . . . .	348
<b>16</b>	<b>Quantum Indeterminacy and Physical Reality as a Relevantly Predicationally Incomplete Existent Entity . . . . .</b>	<b>353</b>
16.1	Quantum Indeterminacy . . . . .	353
16.2	Realist and Idealist Interpretations of Quantum Phenomena . . . . .	355
16.3	Quantum Indeterminacy, Relevant and Irrelevant Predicational Completeness and Incompleteness . . . . .	357
16.4	Predicational Incompleteness in a Meinongian Semantic Framework . . . . .	360
<b>17</b>	<b>Confessions of a Meinongian Logician . . . . .</b>	<b>363</b>
17.1	<i>Mea Culpa</i> . . . . .	363
17.2	Up from Extensionalism . . . . .	365
17.3	My Life as a Meinongian . . . . .	369
17.4	Laboring in the Meinongian Vineyard . . . . .	371
17.5	Road Less Traveled . . . . .	376
17.6	Epilogue . . . . .	380
<b>18</b>	<b>Meinongian Dark Ages and Renaissance . . . . .</b>	<b>381</b>
18.1	Meinongian Anathema . . . . .	381
18.2	Theft Over Honest Labor? . . . . .	382
18.3	Meinongian Logic and the Extensionalist Alternative . . . . .	384

18.4	Nonexistent Intended Objects in the Teleology of Action . . . . .	384
18.5	Ontic Neutrality in the Semantics of Pure Logic . . . . .	386
<b>Appendix: Object Theory Logic and Mathematics: Two Essays by Ernst Mally (Translation and Critical Commentary) . . . . .</b>		<b>389</b>
	Introduction . . . . .	389
	Mally's Logical Contributions . . . . .	390
	1908 Heidelberg Congress . . . . .	391
	Mally's First Paper . . . . .	392
	Logic of Determinations in Mally's Second Essay . . . . .	394
	Conclusion . . . . .	395
	Mally, Object Theory and Mathematics . . . . .	396
	Discussion . . . . .	399
	Mally, Basic Laws of Determination . . . . .	399
	Discussion . . . . .	404
<b>References . . . . .</b>		<b>405</b>
<b>Index . . . . .</b>		<b>421</b>