

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vii
INTRODUCTION	I

MARGINAL PAGE	THE THEAETETUS	PAGE
I42A-I43C.	THE INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE	15
	THE MAIN DIALOGUE	17
I43D-I51D.	Introductory Conversation	17
	<i>I. The Claim of Perception to be Knowledge</i>	<i>29</i>
I51D-E.	Theaetetus identifies knowledge with perception	29
I51E-I52C.	Dialectical combination of Theaetetus' position with Protagoras' doctrine	30
I52C-I53D.	Dialectical combination with the Heracleitean doctrine of Flux	36
I53D-I54B.	Preliminary account of the nature of sense-objects and percipients	39
I54B-I55D.	Some puzzles concerning size and number	41
I55D-I57C.	Theory of the nature of sense-perception	45
I57C-D.	Theaetetus accepts the theory of perception	51
I57E-I60E.	The claim of perception, so defined, to be infallible	52
I60E-I61B.	Interlude. Criticism begins	58
I61B-I63A.	Some objections against Protagoras	60
I63A-I64B.	Objections to a simple identification of perceiving and knowing	62
I64C-I65E.	Socrates undertakes to defend Protagoras	65
I65E-I68C.	The Defence of Protagoras	68
I68C-I69D.	Interlude	75
I69D-I71D.	Criticism of Protagoras' doctrine as extended to all judgments	76
I71D-I72B.	Restatement of the question: Wherein lies the superiority of the wise?	80
I72B-I77C.	Digression. The contrast of Philosophy and Rhetoric	81
I77C-I79C.	Refutation of the Defence of Protagoras	89

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE		PAGE
179C-181B.	The extreme Heraclitean position, contrasted with Parmenides' denial of all motion and change .	92
181B-183C.	Criticism of extreme Heracliteanism	95
183C-184B.	Interlude. Socrates declines to criticise Parmenides	101
184B-186E.	' Perception is Knowledge ' finally disproved .	102
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>II. The Claim of True Judgment to be Knowledge .</i> 109</p>		
187A-C.	Theaetetus states the claim of true judgment .	109
187C-E.	How is false judgment possible ?	110
187E-188C.	False judgment as thinking that one thing (known or unknown) is another thing (known or unknown)	111
188C-189B.	False judgment as thinking the thing that is not .	114
189B-190E.	The apparent impossibility of false judgment as mistaking one thing for another	116
190E-195B.	One class of mistakes can be explained by taking into account memory. The Wax Tablet	120
195B-196C.	False judgment in general cannot, however, be defined as the misfitting of perception to thought	127
196D-199C.	Memory compared to an Aviary, to provide for mistaken judgments not involving perception .	130
199C-200D.	Rejection of ' interchange of pieces of knowledge ' as an account of false judgment	136
200D-201C.	Conclusion: Knowledge cannot be defined as true belief	140
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>III. The Claim of True Belief accompanied by an account or explanation to be Knowledge .</i> 142</p>		
201C-202C.	Socrates states this theory as he has heard it .	142
202C-206C.	The theory criticised for making elements unknowable	146
206C-E.	Three possible meanings of ' account ' : (1) Expression of thought in speech (irrelevant)	154
206E-208B.	(2) Enumeration of elementary parts. This will not convert a true notion into knowledge .	155
208B-210B.	(3) The statement of a distinguishing mark. This will not convert a true notion into knowledge .	158
210B-D.	EPILOGUE. All these attempts to define knowledge have failed	163

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE	THE SOPHIST	PAGE
216A-218D.	Introductory Conversation	165
218D-221C.	Illustrative Division defining the Angler	170
	The seven Divisions defining the Sophist	172
221C-223B.	Division I. The Sophist as hunter	173
223C-224E.	Divisions II-IV. The Sophist as salesman	174
224E-226A.	Division V. Eristic	175
226A-231B.	Division VI. Cathartic method of Socrates	177
	The Methods of Collection and Division	184
231B-235A.	Survey yielding the genus 'Image-making'	187
235A-236C.	Division of Image-making into two species	195
236C-237B.	Statement of the problems of unreal appearances and of falsity in speech and thought	199
	 <i>I. The Worlds of Reality and Appearance</i>	 202
237B-239C.	(a) The totally unreal	203
239C-242B.	(b) Definition of <i>eidolon</i> and the problem of false statement and belief	209
242B-244B.	(c) The perfectly real. What does 'real' mean?	216
244B-245E.	Criticism of Parmenides' One Real Being	220
245E-246E.	The Battle of Gods and Giants. Idealists and Materialists	228
246E-248A.	A mark of the real is offered for the Materialists' acceptance	232
248A-249D.	The Idealists must concede that reality includes some changing things	239
249D-251A.	Transition. What does the Idealist mean by 'real'?	248
	 <i>II. The Combination of Forms and the Problem of Negative Statements</i>	 252
251A-C.	Exclusion of the trivial question, how one individual thing can have many names	253
251C-252E.	Proof that some Forms will combine, others will not	255
252E-253C.	The texture of philosophic discourse	260
253C-254B.	Description of the science of Dialectic	262
	The structure of the world of Forms	268
254B-D.	Three of the most important Forms selected for purposes of illustration: Existence, Motion, Rest.	273

CONTENTS

MARGINAL PAGE		PAGE
254D-255E.	Two further Forms, Sameness and Difference, distinct from these three and all-pervading . . .	279
255E-257A.	A review of true statements involving the five Forms shows that there are any number of true statements asserting that 'what is' in a sense 'is not'	285
257B-258C.	There are also any number of true statements asserting that 'what is not' in a sense 'is' . . .	289
258C-259D.	Conclusion: We have refuted Parmenides' dogma that 'what is' cannot in any sense 'not-be', and that 'what is not' cannot in any sense 'be' . . .	294
	<i>III. False Speaking and Thinking</i>	298
259D-261C.	Introductory statement of the problem	298
261C-262E.	Every statement is a complex of heterogeneous elements (name and verb)	303
262E.	Every statement is about something and is either true or false	308
262E-263B.	The definition of true statement	309
263B-D.	The definition of false statement	311
263D-264B.	Judgment being simply unspoken statement, false judgment and false 'appearing' are possible . . .	318
264B-D	Transition, connecting these results with the interrupted Division of Image-making	320
264D-268D.	Division VII. The Sophist as a species of Image-maker	323
	INDEX	333